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ABSTRACT
The importance of supply chain resilience and semiconductor manufacturing has been
discussed as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic and its later disruptions to multiple industries
(The White House, 2021). This paper uses frameworks developed by Pettit, Fiksel, and Croxton
(2010), Ponomarov and Holcomb (2009), and Rao and Goldsby (2009) to identify the
semiconductor industry’s risks, capabilities, and interdependencies through an analysis of 45
prominent semiconductor companies. The analysis was done on multiple levels. On the industry
level, risks, and capabilities as well as their co-occurrences were analyzed. On the supply chain
level, relationships were mapped using Boston Consulting Group (BCG) and Semiconductor
Industry Association data (SIA, 2021) to understand interdependency and interrelationships.
Finally, a case study was developed to understand the impact of industry characteristics,
interdependency, and supply chain risks and capabilities at the company level. The resulting
overall analysis was used to analyze the relevance and viability of reshoring semiconductor
manufacturing to the U.S. as a means of improving supply chain resilience. The results suggest a
misbalance of the industry’s risk and capabilities. The most commonly identified risks,
macroeconomic and natural uncertainty, were linked to the organization capability. However,
that capability has not been found to address the environmental level risks the semiconductor
companies identified. Instead, there are several other capabilities including flexibility in
sourcing, anticipation, and adaption that are capable of addressing the risks the industry is most
concerned about. Therefore, while reshoring could reduce risk, it may not be necessary if other
solutions are thoroughly explored.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the first year of the Covid-19 pandemic, over 200,000 U.S. businesses were forced to
permanently shut-down. A study completed by the U.S. Federal Reserve System estimates that in
the years following the initial outbreak an additional 600,000 businesses have permanently
closed per year, a rate of roughly 8.5% (Simon, 2021). Factors responsible for these shutdowns
included variations in demand, government-mandated closures, supply chain interruptions, and
shortages of supplies. The extent of this exposure is worldwide and has caused shortages for
goods such as electronics, lumber, cars, and clothing. While the pandemic has made these
vulnerabilities visible, a contributing factor has been an excessive reliance on manufacturing
practices that encouraged outsourcing to countries that offer savings based on low wages and
other practices, such as the just-in-time inventory (Goodman & Chokshi, 2021). However, these
strategies concentrated risks, and companies with global supply chains ran into serious problems
at the start of the pandemic. For example, Ford Motor Company was just one of several U.S.
companies forced to stop production at the end of March 2021 (Witkowski, 2021). The
company’s extensive reliance on semiconductors that are mainly produced in Asia coupled with
limited inventory halted several of its assembly lines, and while the pandemic brought the risk of
these strategies to light, the question now becomes how to mitigate them. This is especially true
when it comes to supplies as critical as semiconductors.
Semiconductors, or chips, are used in the production of several modern technologies such as
smartphones, cars, and televisions. As a result, a global shortage of chips has affected several
sectors beyond just the automotive. Unfortunately, the semiconductor industry has long struggled
to manage its limited number of suppliers and volatile demand schedules (Bauer, et al., 2020).
These issues were further exacerbated by the pandemic which dramatically altered demand
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expectations and eventually production. Accordingly, semiconductor shortages have been at the
forefront of the discussion surrounding supply chain disruptions since the start of the pandemic.
Specifically, the U.S. has recognized how critical semiconductors are to both the economy and
national security. Traditionally, the U.S. has led the production and innovation of
semiconductors since they were invented in 1874. However, there are increasing concerns over
the U.S.’s ability to maintain market leadership (The White House, 2021). According to the
Semiconductor Industry Association, the bulk of chip manufacturing is now being conducted in
Asia and the U.S. has become heavily reliant on a supply chain that has become more global yet
concentrated in a few Asian countries (SIA, 2020) The impact of such reliance is apparent due to
the extensive shut-down of U.S. businesses and the disruptions reported by companies like Ford.
Emphasis is now being placed on finding ways to make the semiconductor supply chain more
resilient so that shortages like those caused by the pandemic are less disruptive to major
industries, and so the U.S. can maintain technological leadership (The White House, 2021). At a
Summit on semiconductor and supply chain resilience, President Joe Biden highlighted that
investment in infrastructure would be necessary to protect U.S. supply chains. However, the
possibility and necessity of this investment have been questioned due to the challenges and costs
associated with the construction of semiconductor manufacturing facilities (Eisenstein, 2021).
Considering the importance of the semiconductor industry for the U.S. and the intricacies of
its supply chain resilience, this paper’s research questions are: What are the risks and
capabilities of the semiconductor industry’s supply chain? How interdependent and
complex is the supply chain? And subsequently, will reshoring semiconductor
manufacturing to the U.S. improve the industry’s supply chain resilience? To inform these
research questions, a multiple level analysis was conducted. On the industry level, risks,
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capabilities, and co-occurrences were analyzed. On the supply chain level, data from BCG X
SIA (2021) was used to map companies’ roles and relationships to understand their
interdependencies. Finally, a case study was developed to understand the practical applications
of such relationships.
In the next section, the paper presents the theoretical background used in this research,
followed by the methodology. Then, the data analysis is presented at three levels, first discussing
the industry, followed by interdependencies of the supply chain, and concluding with a case
study. Finally, the paper discusses the main conclusions and takeaways.

2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The concept of supply chain resilience has been evolving over the last two decades. Still, the
foundation upon which a majority of the research is built remains credible. In 2018, Saenz,
Revilla, & Acero developed a framework for deploying risk management. Rather than reviewing
typologies of risk and capabilities, they used their research to confirm that a universal supply
chain management practice is not possible due to variations across organizations. Mostly, it
stressed the need for a firm to assess its risks and capabilities before designing its supply chain
(Saenz, Revilla, & Acero, 2018). The topic continued to evolve into 2021. Specifically, research
was done on the various perspectives of supply chain resilience. Individuals often confused
resilience with having a fail-safe supply chain at conception rather than building one capable of
transformation and adaption. In the end, it was maintained that supply chain resilience is best
defined by a concept of adaptability, with some emphasis on formulating a strong design at the
forefront (Wieland & Durach, 2021). Overall, this research doesn’t seek to question the results of
its predecessors. Instead, they clarify and expand upon past conclusions. As such, earlier works
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on supply chain resilience were chosen for this paper. These frameworks were highly detailed in
their discussions of both typologies and structures for achieving resilience.

2.1 Supply Chain Risks
Risk has been given various definitions as the topic has evolved. For example, Rowe
defined risk as the “the potential for realizing unwanted negative consequences from causal
events” (1980). Several years later, Mitchell defined risk as the determination of expected loss
(1999). In either case, risk was determined to be an analysis of only negative outcomes.
Risk was later incorporated into the topic of supply chain. Supply chain risks were
defined by Peck as anything that may disrupt or impede the information, material, or product
flows from original supplies to the delivery of the final product to the ultimate end user (2006).
On the other hand, supply chain vulnerability was defined as the susceptibility of a supply chain
to the likelihood and consequences of disruptions (Blos, Quaddus, Wee, & Watanabe, 2009). It
was determined that the broader definition of supply chain vulnerability captured the essence of
supply chain risks. As such, the concepts of vulnerability and the risk exposure of a supply chain
are often conceptualized together (Juttner & Maklan, 2011). Therefore, it is important to note
that some reports describe risks as vulnerabilities and vulnerabilities as risks. Here, the terms are
used interchangeably.
In this paper, supply chain risk is defined as the exposure to an event and the uncertainty
of possible outcomes. Something can only be defined as risky when both of these elements are
present (Rao & Goldsby, 2009). This broader definition ensures a more comprehensive analysis
of all potential supply chain disruptions. Rao & Goldsby developed a typology of risk to provide
an organized structure for sources of risk that could be used to assess the vulnerabilities of a
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supply chain as well as to open up avenues for future research into finding a balance of the
benefits and risks of managing one (2009). As such, there are different types of supply chain
risks and subsequent actions for reducing exposure to them. The risks faced by businesses and
organizations were determined to stem from five sources: environmental factors, industry
factors, organizational factors, problem-specific factors, and decision-maker factors (Rao &
Goldsby, 2009). Together, these factors measure a supply chain’s overall risk. Additionally, each
factor has a collection of related variables.
Figure 1 outlines the identified supply chain risks. First is environmental risk and its
variables. They affect overall businesses across industries. This means that every organization is
affected to some extent. Variables that are considered environmental include political instability,
shifts in government policy, macroeconomic uncertainty, social uncertainty, and natural
uncertainty. Political instability covers changes in political regimes and systems. On the other
hand, policy uncertainty is changes in government policy that affect the business community.
This includes fiscal reforms, monetary reforms, and price controls. Macroeconomic uncertainty
covers fluctuations in economic activity and prices caused by inflation, interest rates, and
exchange rates. Social uncertainty is related to the beliefs and values of a population. Finally,
natural uncertainty includes events such as earthquakes, floods, and fires. It would also include
the Covid-19 pandemic. Next, is industry risk which does not affect all sectors as a whole, but
rather a specific segment of the economy. Its variables include input market uncertainty, product
market uncertainty, and competitive uncertainty. These factors are related to the ability of a firm
to acquire inputs, meet consumer demand, and handle competitors. The next risk is
organizational, which threatens the supply chain at the firm level. The variables associated with
organizational risk include operating uncertainty, production uncertainty, liability uncertainty,
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credit uncertainty, and agency uncertainty. These variables cover how a firm handles its people,
sales, and products. The next type of risk is problem-specific which is related to how a firm
internally manages its risk. It covers the concepts of interrelationships, the use of outsourcing,
and the objectives and constraints of problems. Finally, there’s decision-maker risk which is
related to an individual or decision-making group. It is influenced by one’s knowledge, biases,
and bounded rationality (Rao & Goldsby, 2009). The definitions of these risks and variables are
summarized in Appendix A.

Figure 1: Sources of Supply Chain Risk, Source: Rao, S., & Goldsby, T. (2009)

2.2 Supply Chain Capabilities
A report by Pettit, Fiksel, and Croxton provides the typology for supply chain
capabilities. The goal of their report was to develop the concept of supply chain resilience
through a review of literature on vulnerabilities and the techniques that can be used to overcome
them. As such, this paper defines capabilities as, “attributes that enable an enterprise to anticipate
and overcome disruptions” (Pettit, Fiksel, & Croxton, 2010). Research by these authors has
undergone further analysis in 2013 and later in 2019, but the definition has remained the same.
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They further utilized their review of vulnerabilities and capabilities to develop a conceptual
framework capable of evaluating and improving resilience. The literature review allowed them to
identify capabilities they believe best contribute to increasing a supply chain’s level of resilience.
However, they further believe that the best level of resilience can only be achieved when balance
is maintained between capabilities and vulnerabilities.
The report identified fourteen capability factors and 71 related sub-factors that when
factored into a supply chain, increases its resilience (Pettit, Fiksel, & Croxton, 2010). The first
capability factor is flexibility of sourcing which occurs when a firm can quickly change inputs
and how it receives them. Flexibility in order fulfillment means a firm has the ability to change
outputs and how it delivers them. Sub-factors related to these capabilities can include having
supplier contract flexibility or a modular product design. Another capability is capacity which is
the availability of assets to sustain production levels. This is present when a firm has reserve
capacity or backup energy sources. There is also efficiency which is when a firm can produce
outputs with minimum resource requirements. Sub-factors include waste elimination, labor
productivity, and failure prevention. Visibility is also a capability factor. It is a firm’s knowledge
of its operating assets and the environment. This covers information technology, information
exchange, and business intelligence gathering. Next is adaptability, the ability to modify
operations in response to challenges or opportunities. The sub-factors include lead time
reduction, learning from experience, and alternative technology development. Another capability
is anticipation which is defined as the ability to discern potential future events. A firm may do
this by monitoring early warning signals, forecasting, or taking part in risk management. Another
important element is recovery which is when a firm can return to its normal operational state
quickly through crisis management, resource mobilization, or consequence mitigation. The next
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capability is dispersion which is the broad distribution or decentralization of assets through
distributing decision-making, decentralizing key resources, and diversifying markets. Next, is
collaboration. This means working effectively with other entities for mutual benefit. The related
sub-factors include collaborative forecasting, customer management, communications, and risk
sharing. Another capability is organization which covers human resource structures, policies,
skills, and culture. The sub-factors break down this capability into aspects such as learning,
teamwork, creative problem solving, and empowerment. Next, is market position which is the
status of a company or its products in specific markets. The sub-factors are production
differentiation, customer loyalty, market share, and brand equity. Another capability is security
which is a firm’s defense against intrusion or attack. This covers personnel security,
collaboration with governments, and cyber-security. The final capability factor is financial
strength. This is when a firm has the capacity to absorb fluctuations in cash flow. The sub-factors
include insurance, portfolio diversification, financial reserves, liquidity, and price margins
(Pettit, Fiksel, & Croxton, 2010). These capabilities and their related sub-factors are summarized
in Appendix B.

2.3 Supply Chain Resilience
The concept of supply chain resilience has been researched and applied extensively since
2010. Most research continues to refine definitions and frameworks, advance the understanding
of certain concepts, evaluate topics using case studies, and extend the idea of resilience to global
supply chains. However, the debate on what constitutes reliance is ongoing, and further research
must explore vulnerabilities and capabilities, as well as investigate the strengths of suppliers and
customers along the supply chain (Pettit, Croxton, & Fiksel, 2019).
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A report by Ponomarov and Holcomb (2009) provides an integrated perspective on the
concept of supply chain resilience as it relates to supply chain management and risk
management. As such, it captures the intricacies of the topic in several disciplines. Therefore,
this paper defines chain resilience as, “The adaptive capability of the supply chain to prepare for
unexpected events, respond to disruptions, and recover from them by maintaining continuity of
operations at the desired level of connectedness and control of structure and function”
(Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009). The report noted that, at the time, the concepts of supply chain
management and risks were emerging disciplines in need of unified definitions. However, it was
agreed that the increased risks that have resulted from complex and geographically dispersed
supply chains have made the understanding of supply chain resilience far more critical
(Ponomarov & Holcomb, 2009).
As presented in figure 2, supply chain resilience is operationalized by increasing
capabilities and decreasing risks, or vulnerabilities. By measuring these variables, it becomes
possible to evaluate a supply chain’s current level of resilience and is the essence behind
proposition 1 (Pettit, Fiksel, & Croxton, 2010). However, the framework also asserts postulates
that provide the necessary foundation for this model. First, forces of change are what create
supply chain vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities stem from the fact that supply chain disturbances
can be internal or external and affects parts of an organization differently, but they all result from
some type of change. The second postulate states that management controls create supply chain
capabilities. Capabilities can prevent a disruption, mitigate the effects of disruption, or enable
adaption from a disruption. (Pettit, Fiksel, & Croxton, 2010).
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Figure 2: Pettit, T., Fiksel, J., & Croxton, K. (2010)

Further research recommends balancing capabilities against vulnerabilities to ensure
balanced resilience, a state that reduces risk, but does not erode profits (Pettit, Croxton, & Fiksel,
2013). However, finding the linkages between capabilities and vulnerabilities, that is the
capabilities best suited to reducing a particular risk, is complicated. Only a convergence of
multiple methods of analysis can reveal valid linkages (Boyer & Swink, 2008). The research
done by Pettit, Fiksel, & Croxton (2013) used a combination of literature, survey responses, and
pattern matching to form a basis for identifying valid links. However, the study is still limited to
its specific identified risks as well as the biases of the data set. In total, the sample represented
seven firms across varying industries. Still, using its identified vulnerabilities, it identified
several potential linkages (See Appendix C). For example, it determined that connectivity risk is
best linked to capabilities such as adaptability, anticipation, collaboration, and organization.
Collectivity risk was defined as the degree of interdependence and reliance on outside entities
with sub-factors including degree of outsourcing, reliance on specialty sources, and channels of
imports and exports. It is important to note that a later report published by these authors
recommends that supply chain resilience frameworks be adapted to account for industry specific
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characteristics (Pettit, Croxton, & Fiksel, 2019). Therefore, one must account for the unique
complexities of the semiconductor industry when identifying potential linkages between risks
and capabilities.

3. METHODS
3.1 Industry Level Data Collection
To explore the possibility of reshoring the semiconductor industry’s supply chain, major
semiconductor companies worldwide were first identified. Cases were selected from the database
D&B Hoovers using the NAICS code 334413 (semiconductor and other manufacturing
activities) in order to generate a list of the top semiconductor companies from across the globe.
We looked at the top companies that appeared in the search based on the following criteria:


Market Value



Annual Sales



Number of Employees

3.1.1Sample
The data collected generated an original sample size of 60 companies operating in the
semiconductor industry. D&B Hoovers also provided data such as headquarters location (by
country, state, and city), the number of sites worldwide, year founded, number of employees,
sector, industry, annual sales, sales growth, and market value (See Appendix D).
After the first round of data collection involving all 60 companies, the sample size was
narrowed down due to barriers in data gathering. Specifically, companies were removed due to a
lack of English translations, companies having been recently acquired by competitors, and lack
of general reporting. The final list analyzed in this paper encompassed 45 companies.
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3.1.2 Supply Chain Risks and Capabilities Coding Process
Data was analyzed using the software QDA Miner which allows a user to analyze
qualitative data by coding lines of text. The 45 company’s most readily available documents,
including annual reports, SEC filings, and sustainability reports were compiled for coding. The
reporting years ranged from 2018-2021. The reports were coded based on existing literature
outlining supply chain risks and capabilities.
Coding was completed through a process of text retrieval using key words and
subsequent generation of paragraphs of associated text. Reports were searched for key words and
would generate a certain number of hits. The key words included risk (3,114 hits), supply chain
(834 hits), supplier (401 hits) and semiconductor (2,969 hits). The hits were then coded if they
were determined to be an identified supply chain risk or capability (see Appendix A & B). In
total, the coding process involved the importing of the company reports, key word analysis,
sample reading, and subsequent coding of the 45 company reports for an estimated number of
8,500 pages. It is also estimated that a total of 100 hours were spent on the coding process alone.
An example hit when searching risk was as follows:

“Key risks identified and managed in 2020 were those related to the COVID-19
pandemic, as well as those related to the finalization of both the transformation of the
Group and the separation of the Power Grids business.”
Source: ABB Power Grids Annual Report 2020

Based on the discussion of the Covid-19 pandemic this text was coded to fall under a
natural uncertainty risk. Additionally, the complexity of the transformation of the business
identified there to be problem-specific uncertainty risk. An additional hit example includes:
13

“ABB has an enterprise risk management program (ERM) in place which takes into
account ABB’s size and complexity. ERM provides the EC and the Board with a
comprehensive and holistic view of the risks facing the business. ERM involves managing
the acceptance of risk to achieve the objectives of the business. The ERM process is
typically cyclical in nature, conveying the idea of continuous refinement of the risk
management approach in a dynamic business environment.”
Source: ABB Power Grids Annual Report 2020

This first half of the retrieved text was coded as an anticipation capability factor because
it shows the firm’s monitoring of early warning signals and use of risk management. The second
half was coded as a visibility capability factor due to the use of information technology to
provide visibility on its entire business environment.

3.2 Supply Chain Level Data Collection
To analyze the distribution of companies across the semiconductor supply chain, several
sources of data were compiled for analysis. Electronic sources included:


State of the U.S. Semiconductor Industry (SIA, 2020)



State of the U.S. Semiconductor Industry (SIA, 2021)



Strengthening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain (BCG X SIA, 2021)



Semiconductors: U.S. Industry, Global Competition, and Federal Policy (Platzer, Sargent
Jr., & Sutter, 2020)



U.S. Semiconductor Manufacturing: Industry Trends, Global Competition, Federal Policy
(Platzer & Sargent Jr., 2016)
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Building Resilient Supply Chains, Revitalizing American Manufacturing, and Fostering
Broad-Based Growth (The White House, 2021).

These six reports were compiled and then read in order to discern the 45 identified
companies’ business models and position on the supply chain. Next, an interview was conducted
with a past employee of the industry to gauge the accuracy of this data as well as to gauge the
opinion of reshoring semiconductor manufacturing to the U.S. This employee had experience
working at a fabrication facility making microprocessors as well as working for a semiconductor
equipment manufacturer. In this role, the individual installed equipment at SMIC in China,
TSMC in Taiwan, and AMD in Germany (Lamb, 2022).

3.2 Company Level Data Collection
Finally, to analyze the complexity of the supply chain and interrelationships, data was
collected at the company level. A Bloomberg terminal was utilized to map the relationship value
between the case study company and its suppliers. Data gathered for the industry and supply
chain level was also used in this analysis.

4. DATA ANALYSIS
A form of deductive analysis done using mainly qualitative methods. The data analysis was
conducted at three levels: industry, supply chain, and company.

4.1 Industry Level
The semiconductor industry is an extremely complex network of countries and
organizations. The industry’s worldwide revenue in 2020 was roughly $440 billion with sales
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forecasted at $573 billion for 2022. This growth is largely due to the industry’s rapidly growing
demand and innovations. Specifically, semiconductors are expected to enable technologies such
as 5G, electric vehicles, internet of things, and artificial intelligence (SIA, 2021).
Table 1 shows the breakdown of the 45 semiconductor companies analyzed in this paper.
They represent six industries across a total 12 countries. As of 2020, annual sales ranged from
$297 million to $274 billion. Additionally, 87% of the companies reported sales of over $1
million. The number of employees ranges from 30 to roughly 240,000 and the number of sites
worldwide ranges from four to 3,611.

Table 1: Descriptive Company Data, Global
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Figure 3 shows the dispersion of companies by region. 58% of the companies are
headquartered in the U.S., 16% are headquartered in Taiwan, 4% are headquartered in China,
and 4% are headquartered in South Korea. The other 18% represent one company in each of the
following regions: Cayman Islands, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, Israel, Japan, Netherlands,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

Figure 3: Company by Country

Figure 4 is a breakdown of the companies by state. Within the U.S., 27% of the
companies are located in California, 9% are located in Arizona, 4% are in North Carolina, and
18% represent one company in each of the following states: Idaho, Texas, Illinois, Florida,
Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. 29% are located outside the
U.S. and 13% are unidentified by state.
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Figure 4: Company by State, note: 6 company state locations not available

Table 2 further breaks down the characteristics of the companies located within the U.S.
They represent two industries with annual sales constituting the highest and lowest ends of the
sample. The number of employees ranges from 900 to 240,062.

Table 2: Descriptive Company Data, United States

18

Table 3 reveals the distribution of codes for supply chain risks. The top three most
frequently coded risks were macroeconomic uncertainty (15.9%), natural uncertainty (12.0%),
and operations uncertainty (11.1%). Still, other highly coded risks were credit uncertainty
(10.2%) and policy uncertainty (10.0%). Macroeconomic, natural, and policy uncertainty are
considered environmental risks which affect all businesses across industries. At this level, every
organization is going to be affected to some degree. Therefore, it may explain why they were
coded so frequently, especially following the disruptions of the Covid-19 pandemic. However,
operations and credit uncertainty are organizational risks. Therefore, there are also concerns
about firm specific variables that have the potential to disrupt the entire supply chain.
Interestingly, the most commonly coded risks are ones that occur at the environmental and
organizational level, passing over industry level risks. In fact, the highest coded industry level
risk, competition, is ranked seventh (7.5%), followed by input market uncertainty (7.1%), and
product market uncertainty (6.7%).

Table 3: Sample Risks
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Table 4 reveals the most commonly coded capabilities. The top three were organization
(19.6%), anticipation (16.5%), and collaboration (12%). Other highly coded capabilities were
financial strength (11.2%) and market position (10.4%). It is important to note that organization
as a capability should not be confused with the discussion of risks that occur at the organizational
level.

Table 4. Sample Capabilities

One may utilize the linkages identified by Pettit, Fiksel, & Croxton (2013), to reveal that
all five capabilities are linked to the vulnerability of connectivity. Additionally, three of the five
capabilities are linked to supplier/customer disruptions. These vulnerabilities are similar to
industry level risks identified by Rao & Goldsby (2009) that were used for coding. This reveals
that, despite experiencing risks that occur at the environmental and organizational level, most
companies are responding with capabilities that are said to address risks at the industry level.
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To support the linkages identified by Pettit, Fiksel, & Croxton (2013), and to consider the
industry characteristics that affect semiconductor companies, co-occurrences were analyzed. Cooccurrences reveal the frequency at which codes occur together. Therefore, they reveal links
between vulnerabilities and capabilities. Additionally, because the data is gathered from
semiconductor companies, it accounts for the nuances of the industry. Figure 5 shows some of
the strongest co-occurrences that resulted from the coding process. It highlights relationship
values greater than 0.550 and shows risks in red and capabilities in blue. The top five highest cooccurrences are between macroeconomic uncertainty & credit uncertainty (0.878),
macroeconomic uncertainty & organization (0.867), natural uncertainty & operations uncertainty
(0.795), macroeconomic uncertainty & operations uncertainty (0.791), and three links that have
the same co-occurrences link (0.756). Those three links are organization & credit uncertainty,
organization & operations uncertainty, and operations uncertainty & credit uncertainty.
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Figure 5: Co-Occurrences of Coding

Of these co-occurrences, there are several that identify links between risks and
capabilities. Specifically, the greatest risk, macroeconomic uncertainty, was frequently coded
with the highest reported capability, organization. Again, organization is the structures, policies,
and cultures of a firm that allow it to problem solve risks. Additionally, while natural uncertainty
was only highly correlated with operations uncertainty, operations uncertainty was frequently
coded with the organization capability. This may suggest by transitive law a connection between
natural uncertainty and organization capability. These two risks, macroeconomic and natural, are
environmental level risks and their linked capability, organization, has been found to address
only industry level type risks (Pettit, Croxton, & Fiksel, 2013). Alternatively, when one analyzes
the industry and firm level risks, there is no link above 0.756 at which a risk is linked to a
22

capability. Additionally, three of the top five risks are relying on the capability of the
organization to mitigate disturbances. However, Pettit, Fiksel, & Croxton (2013) only linked
organization to one risk, connectivity, which is the degree of interdependence and reliance on
outside entities. However, as the paper will discuss, the semiconductor industry is known for
being highly interdependent and may play a role in this apparent misbalance of capabilities to
vulnerabilities.
Overall, this data reveals that a majority of these companies feel that their greatest risks
are those posed by the business environment and that their greatest capability is their
organization. Additionally, the data revealed that these companies are in fact using the
organizational capability to address their environmental risks. However, past research suggests
that this capability is not capable of reducing environmental risks, only industry level risks.
Therefore, one may discern that the semiconductor industry is not properly balancing its supply
chain risks and capabilities. Therefore, it is at risk of experiencing disruptions.

4.2 Supply Chain Level
Because semiconductors are highly specialized pieces of technology, the industry requires high
levels of investment into R&D and capital expenditures. Additionally, the need for advanced
technology and robust infrastructure has resulted in the integrated global supply chain that exists
today. Specifically, the value chain can be sorted into seven activities that are outlined in Figure
6. The high-level steps are pre-competitive research, design, front end manufacturing (wafer
fabrication), and back-end manufacturing (assembly, packaging, and testing). These steps are
then supported by electronic design automation (EDA) & core intellectual property (IP),
equipment & tools, and materials (BCG X SIA, 2021).
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Figure 6. Semiconductor Supply Chain. Source: Siegler and Bowen (2021) and SIA (2021).

The supply chain tier of a semiconductor company is highly correlated to its business
model. The four business models include integrated device manufacturers (IDMs), fabless design
firms, foundries and outsourced assembly and test companies (OSATs). Design activities are
typically performed by fabless companies and front-end manufacturing, or wafer fabrication, is
supported by foundries. OSATs specialize in back-end manufacturing. Finally, IDMs are
vertically integrated across the entire value chain. However, an IDM may choose to outsource
some of its activities to other organizations (BCG X SIA, 2021). This value chain spans roughly
six major regions and various countries are known to specialize in different activities.
The U.S. is the current global sales market leader (47%) with a focus on R&D activities
such as EDA & core IP, chip design, and manufacturing equipment. East Asia, especially
Taiwan, specializes in wafer fabrication which requires the highest level of capital investment.
China is the leader in assembly, packaging, and testing. Due to the dispersion and specialization
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of these activities, all countries involved have become dependent on the global supply chain
(BCG X SIA, 2021).
The semiconductor shortage increased the U.S.’s awareness of its dependence on
overseas production and raised concerns about its market leadership. Specifically, the U.S.’s
share of global semiconductor manufacturing has fallen from 37% in 1990 to 12% in 2021.
Overall, the U.S. has failed to invest in chip manufacturing and now Asia is home to 75% of the
world’s semiconductor manufacturing capacity. This includes the capacity to produce the most
leading-edge semiconductors, 10 nanometers, which are critical to previously discussed
technological advancements. Currently, the U.S. has no manufacturing facilities that support the
production of these leading-edge semiconductors. The lack of manufacturing capabilities raises
concerns because it undermines the country’s ability to support economic recovery, power
critical infrastructure, create high-paying jobs, and drive innovations in future technology (SIA,
2021).
Utilizing the supply chain graphic developed by Siegler and Bowen (2021) and SIA
(2021), Figure 7 was developed to highlight where on the supply chain the 45 companies
analyzed in this paper are positioned. A report published by the Congressional Research Service
(2020) provided the data on a majority of the companies’ business models. This research was
further supported by the BCG X SIA report on strengthening the global semiconductor supply
chain (2021). Only the companies ABB, Amphenol, BOE, CMC Materials, First Solar, Vishay,
Celestica, and TCL were mapped after researching the company website for its appropriate
business model.
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Figure 7. Companies Mapped Across the Supply Chain

Table 5 summarizes the distribution of business models in certain identified regions. It
highlights regions that are the headquarters to more than one company or maintain a significant
share of the sample. In total, 40% of the companies are IDMs that specialize in multiple areas
across the value chain. Of this, 61% are in the U.S., 6% are in Taiwan, and 22% are located in
other East Asian countries. Next, 31% are foundries that specialize in front end wafer fabrication
with 36% in the U.S., 29% in Taiwan and 21% located across other East Asian countries.
Finally, 22% are fabless semiconductor companies that focus on design. Specifically, 70% are
located in the U.S., 20% are in Taiwan, and 10% are in the U.K.
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Table 5: Business Models by Region

Of this sample, several things become clear. First, the U.S. represents the majority across
every business model. This also includes the sole companies listed under OSAT, Equipment &
Tools, and OEM. South Korea boasts the second-highest number of IDMs and Taiwan reports
the second-highest level of both foundries and fabless companies. Still, several regions are
represented across various parts of the value chain.
This data may suggest that the U.S. is not under as much competitive pressure to reshore
manufacturing as previously suggested because it maintains the greatest visibility across business
models. Unfortunately, there are several limitations to this data. For one, the sample may not be
representative of the entire industry. Also, the locations of these companies are recorded by
headquarters only. Therefore, the number of manufacturing facilities, the production capabilities,
and the capacity of these companies is unknown. However, as previously stated, the U.S. does
not currently have manufacturing sites capable of producing leading edge semiconductors (SIA,
2021). This may suggest that the U.S. maintains visibility in the industry but has fallen behind in
terms of advancing its production facilities with new innovations. As discussed, significant
capital investment is required to establish manufacturing facilities for wafer fabrication.
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4.3 Company Level
A case study on Apple was done to understand the complexity that results from the
overlap of risks, capabilities, and the interdependent supply chain.
4.3.1 Risks & Capabilities
Table 6 exhibits Apple’s coded risks and capabilities. Risks appear in red, and
capabilities appear in green. Its greatest risks were macroeconomic uncertainty, natural
uncertainty, and liability uncertainty. Its greatest capabilities were financial strength and
organization. These results are similar to those found at the industry level analysis in that two of
its three greatest risks are environmental, but its most commonly identified capabilities are those
that are linked to industry level risks.

Table 6: Apple’s Risks & Capabilities
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4.3.1 Supply Chain
Figure 8 was developed using the supply chain maps of figures 5 and 6 as well as data
obtained from a Bloomberg Terminal. It discloses Apple’s tier 1, 2, and 3 suppliers as well as
what percent of the suppliers’ revenue originates from Apple. All of the arrows directed at Apple
originate from its tier 1 suppliers.

Figure 8: Apple’s Supply Chain

Further tiers were analyzed in order to trace suppliers across the semiconductor value
chain. First, Amkor was identified as one of Apple’s tier 1 suppliers and roughly 13.70% of its
revenue originates from Apple. This company is considered an OSAT which means its function
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is to assemble, package, and test semiconductors. Next, Amkor’s suppliers include AMD,
Broadcom, Global Foundries, TSMC, Maxim, Intel, and Qorvo. Some of these companies
function as foundries and complete the wafer fabrication process. Others are IDMs, meaning
they may be completing any of the possible operations of the value chain. These would also be
considered Apple’s tier 2 suppliers. Global Foundries was then selected to identify Apple’s tier 3
suppliers. From this sample, Global Foundries receives supplies from Dialog, a fabless company.
The function of this supplier is to design semiconductor technology. Overall, this network is an
example of how various companies are connected through direct links across the supply chain in
accordance with the functions of their business models.
Apple also has several tier 1 suppliers that specialize in operations scattered across the
value chain. For example, Qorvo, Hon Hai, and Dialog are direct suppliers to Apple, but one is
considered an IDM, one a foundry, and one fabless. Additionally, Dialog is considered to be both
a tier 1 and a tier 3 supplier due to its business with Global Foundries. This network shows how
semiconductor companies are often connected for several different reasons or to specialize in
varying activities. It also highlights how interdependent the companies are. For example, nearly
65% of Dialog’s revenue and 57% of Hon Hai’s revenue originates from Apple. To further that
point, this figure has been simplified to only trace the supply chain backwards through the tiers.
In reality, several of these companies function as both customers and suppliers. For example,
Global Foundries is both a supplier and a customer of Amkor while Samsung is both a supplier
and a competitor to Apple.
Additionally, Apple’s tier 1 suppliers identified in this Figure are dispersed across several
regions. 60% are headquartered in the U.S., 12% in Taiwan, 8% in South Korea, 4% each in the
U.K., China, Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands.

30

4.3.3 Co-occurrences
Figure 9 is a relationship matrix that reveals the similarity of specific cases according to
coding frequencies. Apple is represented as Case #6 and had high similarity scores with Xilinx
(0.932), ON Semiconductor (0.880), and Tower (0.876).

Figure 9: Relationship Matrix of Companies

Surprisingly, an analysis of the breakdown of codes still revealed several differences. The
most similar company was Xilinx which is one of Apple’s tier 1 suppliers that is also
headquartered in the U.S. Its top four codes, in decreasing order, were macroeconomic
uncertainty, natural uncertainty, dispersion, and financial strength. The similarity of location,
established business connection, and industry wide impact of Covid-19 may explain the high
relationship score. However, one would then expect Apple to have high relationship scores with
several of its other U.S. based tier 1 suppliers. This thought is not entirely unsupported. The next
highest relationship was with ON Semiconductor which is both a tier 1 supplier and
headquartered in the U.S. However, it was most commonly coded for liability uncertainty,
natural uncertainty, policy uncertainty, and credit uncertainty. This differs from Apple and
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Xilinx, but still captures mainly environmental and organizational level risk factors. Finally, the
third highest relationship value was between Apple and Tower. Unlike its counterparts, this
company is headquartered in Israel and is not a tier 1 supplier for Apple. It was most commonly
coded with liability uncertainty, macroeconomic uncertainty, competition uncertainty, and
organization. Competition is the only industry level risk to appear in one of the top risks.
However, the majority are still environmental and organizational level risks. The only easily
identifiable similarity between all three of these companies is purely the fact that they all have
operate in the semiconductor industry, supported by their NAICS codes. In reviewing company
characteristics, Tower is the smallest according to number of employees, annual sales, and
number of sites worldwide.
Overall, this data supports the conclusions posed at the industry and supply chain levels.
For example, similar to the industry analysis, it shows how a company is identifying its greatest
risks as those that occur at the environmental level but are responding with capabilities that
resolve industry level risks. From the supply chain analysis, it supports the conclusion that the
U.S. maintains a lot of visibility in the supply chain.
Additionally, the high similarity scores between Apple and other companies, despite no
easily identified similarities, may suggest that semiconductor companies are alike simply for
operating in the same industry. Therefore, the supply chain must be highly interdependent and
the data from the sample may be more representative of the entire industry than previously
thought. If this is the case, and the industry is indeed misbalancing risks and capabilities, then the
industry is still highly susceptible to disruptions. As a result, actions should be taken to reduce
the most commonly identified risks.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
It has been argued that semiconductor manufacturing should be reshored to the U.S. to,
among other things, maintain America’s competitive edge (Biden, 2021). Although this action
has been discussed by authorities such as the U.S. government and the Semiconductor Industry
Association, there are still others who question the success of such a venture. In an interview
with a past employee of the industry, it was revealed that this line of business is known for
experiencing these periods of “bank or bust”. Currently, the industry is in a “bank” era where
everyone is investing in semiconductors. However, this individual believes as soon as sites are
established in the U.S., new chip innovations will have been produced, and competitors will have
moved on. Essentially, it will revert to being a bust (Lamb, 2022). With these considerations in
mind, will reshoring the semiconductor industry improve its supply chain resilience, and is
reshoring worth the costs? The multiple-level analysis of the industry, its supply chain, and a
relevant case study have drawn a few conclusions that may glean an answer.
The analysis of both the sample of semiconductor companies and the case study revealed
several things. For one, it was determined that the industry experiences its greatest risks at the
environmental level. Therefore, issues like fluctuations in economic activity and the threat of
natural disasters are of the greatest concern to these industry leaders. However, the most
commonly identified capability of these companies was their organization. They have faith in
their organization’s culture of teamwork, learning, and problem-solving. The question becomes
whether this is enough to address the risks faced by this industry, especially considering it was
the only capability to be linked to the most frequently coded risks.
According to Pettit, Fiksel, & Croxton (2013), the capabilities of an organization are only
capable of addressing the risk they identified as being connectivity, or interdependence. This risk
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arises from experiencing factors such as a supply chain with several members, a globally
distributed supply chain, requiring specialty components, and needing the continuous flow of
information. These are all attributes that characterize the semiconductor industry. Therefore,
these companies may be responding to their knowledge of the interdependence of their supply
chains with a reliance on the organization capability. However, this knowledge may be causing
them to overlook the other risks they are facing and causing them to excessively rely on one
capability.
If the other risk and capability links identified by Pettit, Fiksel, & Croxton (2013) are
believed to hold here and can account for the unique characteristics of the semiconductor
industry supply chain, then there are several ways to address the most commonly coded risks.
Specifically, Pettit, Fiksel, & Croxton identified several other capabilities that address
organizational level risks, environmental risks, and industry level risks collectively. For example,
flexibility in sourcing, flexibility in order fulfillment, adaptability, and anticipation are just a few
capabilities that address all kinds of risk (see Appendix C). Currently, these capabilities are not
being commonly coded alongside the highest supply chain risks as is the case for organization.
Therefore, the industry has the ability to explore several different options for increasing
resilience and may not be limited to just reshoring.
Still, will reshoring manufacturing to the U.S. improve supply chain resilience? It depends on
the extent to which reshoring will add these new capability factors the industry can use to
address its identified risks. These risks include macroeconomic, natural, and operations
uncertainty. If reshoring, for example, provides firms with the capability of adapting to uncertain
events or allows firms to anticipate disruptions, then reshoring may be beneficial. This is because
it will have added more capability factors, which strengthen overall supply chain resilience.
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However, there can still be debate over whether reshoring is actually necessary. As pointed
out, establishing manufacturing facilities requires significant funding. Taiwan has been investing
in semiconductor manufacturing since 1974 and the government has established industrial parks,
provided incentives for building new fabs, and given out tax credits to cover as much as 35% of
capital expenses. To compare, incentives for building fabs in the U.S. are about 10-15% of total
cost of ownership (BCG X SIA, 2021). Therefore, for the U.S. and its semiconductor companies,
it may be worth exploring alternative ways to add capability factors such as anticipation and
adaptability that do not require as much capital expenditure.
It is also important to note that adding more facilities does not necessarily guarantee supply
chain resilience. In a study done by Kim et al. (2015), it was determined that denser, more
complex networks do not always have higher resilience. Instead, resilience is more dependent on
how a network is configured. Currently, the semiconductor industry is complex due to its
interdependent supply chain and years of specialization. For example, there are over 50 points
across the semiconductor value chain upon which a single region is relied upon for 65% or more
of total global supply (BCG X SIA, 2021). Therefore, if facilities are added it must be done
strategically, in a way that truly benefits the complexity of the supply chain. This may mean
adding additional facilities outside the U.S.
Additionally, within this sample, the U.S. maintained a majority across all types of business
models. Therefore, it had a foothold at every step of the value chain. This may suggest that the
U.S. is under less competitive pressure than it believes. However, it is difficult to provide a
comprehensive analysis without an understanding of the whole picture. Further research should
be done at the facility level to truly understand the technology and capacity the U.S. has for
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producing semiconductors in the U.S. This data is currently difficult to obtain but could reveal
with more clarity the next steps the semiconductor industry and the U.S. should take.
Overall, the semiconductor industry is worth further analysis. Although the Covid-19
pandemic made its supply chain risks visible to us through disruptions to major industries, it
provided the opportunity to critically explore the industry’s risks, capabilities, and
interdependencies. This paper revealed it is indeed highly interdependent and complex.
Therefore, any steps taken to address the misbalance of risks and capabilities will be a step in the
right direction, especially for technology as powerful as semiconductors.
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Appendix A

Supply Chain Risk Factors and Variables. Source: Rao, S., & Goldsby, T. (2009)
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Appendix B

Supply Chain Capabilities and Factors. Source: Pettit, Fiksel, & Croxton (2010).
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Appendix C

Supply Chain Vulnerabilities & Factor Linkages. Source: Pettit, Fiksel, & Croxton (2013).
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Appendix D
Company
HQ City
HQ State
Sites Worldwide
ABB Power Grids Switzerland
Baden
Aargau
3611
Advanced Micro Devices (AMD)
Santa Clara
California
73
Amkor Technology
Tempe
Arizona
51
Amphenol Corporation
Wallingford
Connecticut
515
Analog Devices
Norwood
Massachusetts
91
Apple
Cupertino
California
726
BOE Technology Group
Beijing
Beijing
137
Broadcom Inc.
San Jose
California
418
Celestica LLC
Merrimack
New Hampshire
371
CMC Materials, Inc.
Aurora
Illinois
54
Cree, Inc.
Durham
North Carolina
16
Cypress
San Jose
California
233
Dialog Semiconductor
Reading
N/A
40
First Solar
Tempe
Arizona
35
Global Foundries U.S. Inc.
Santa Clara
California
696
Hon Hai Precision Industry
New Taipei City
N/A
363
Hua Hong Semiconductor Limited
Central District
N/A
369
Infineon Technologies AG
Neubiberg
Bayern
230
Intel Corporation
Santa Clara
California
323
Jabil Inc.
Saint Petersburg
Florida
183
Lam Research Corporation
Fremont
California
109
Marvell Technology
Santa Clara
California
89
Maxim Integrated Products
San Jose
California
70
Microchip Technology Inc.
Chandler
Arizona
262
Micron
Boise
Idaho
94
Novatek Microelectronics Corp.
Hsinchu City
N/A
4
Nuvoton Technology Corporation
Hsinchu City
N/A
16
Nvidia
Santa Clara
California
85
NXP Semiconductors N.V.
Eindhoven
Noord-Brabant
113
On Semiconductor
Phoenix
Arizona
115
Qorvo
Greensboro
North Carolina
89
Qualcomm Technologies, Inc.
San Diego
California
147
Realtek Semiconductor Corporation
Paoshan Hsiang
N/A
11
Renesas Semiconductor Manufacturing
Hitachinaka
Ibaraki
121
Samsung Electronics
Gyeonggi
N/A
682
Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC)
George Town
N/A
5
SK Hynix
Icheon
Gyeonggi
40
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC)
Hsinchu City
N/A
27
TCL Technology Group
Huizhou
Guangdong
158
Texas Insurements Incorporated
Dallas
Texas
191
Tower Semiconductor
Migdal Haemek
N/A
13
United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC)
Hsinchu City
N/A
16
Vanguard International Semiconductor Corporation
Paoshan Hsiang
N/A
5
Vishay Intertechnology, Inc.
Malvern
Pennsylvania
156
Xilinx
San Jose
California
57

Year Founded
HQ Country
# Employees
2019
Switzerland
2900
1969
United States
12600
1968
United States
29050
1932
United States
80000
1965
United States
15900
1977
United States
147000
1993
China
76459
1991
United States
21000
1997
United States
900
1999
United States
2082
1987
United States
5130
2019
United States
5871
1998
United Kingdom
1360
1999
United States
5100
2008
United States
9795
1974
Taiwan
7000
2005
Hong Kong SAR
30
1999
Germany
43800
1968
United States
110600
1966
United States
240062
1980
United States
11300
2020
United States
616
1983
United States
7115
1989
United States
19500
1978
United States
43000
1997
Taiwan
1900
2008
Taiwan
1678
1993
United States
18975
2006
Netherlands
28900
1992
United States
34500
1981
United States
7900
2011
United States
15020
1987
Taiwan
5247
1953
Japan
3500
1969
South Korea
112599
2000
Cayman Islands
15946
1949
South Korea
28769
1987
Taiwan
38000
1982
China
35379
1930
United States
30000
1993
Isreal
5500
1980
Taiwan
19426
1994
Taiwan
6010
1962
United States
23000
1984
United States
4891

Sector
private
public
public
public
public
public
public
public
private
public
public
private
public
public
private
public
public
public
public
public
public
private
public
public
public
public
public
public
public
public
public
private
public
private
public
private
public
public
public
public
public
public
public
public
public

Industry
NAICS
SIC
Annual Sales (2020)
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334413 Component
36780000 Manufacturing
$
82,098,328,000
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334413 Component
36740200 Manufacturing
$
9,763,000,000
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334413 Component
36740000 Manufacturing
$
5,050,588,900
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334417 Component
36780000 Manufacturing
$
8,598,900,400
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334413 Component
36740200 Manufacturing
$
5,603,056,200
Communications Equipment334220
Manufacturing
36639906 $ 274,515,000,000
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334413 Component
36740000 Manufacturing
$
19,631,680,000
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334413 Component
36740100 Manufacturing
$
23,888,000,000
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334413 Component
36790100 Manufacturing
$
297,350,430
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334413 Component
36740000 Manufacturing
$
1,116,270,000
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334413 Component
36740200 Manufacturing
$
903,900,020
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334413 Component
36740000 Manufacturing
$
2,205,314,000
Architechutre and Engineering
541330 87110000 $
1,375,924,000
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334413 Component
36740306 Manufacturing
$
2,711,332,000
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334419 Component
36710000 Manufacturing
$1,581,977,400
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334413 Component
36720000 Manufacturing
$ 181,782,300,000
Electronics Wholesale
423690 50650309 $
961,278,990
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334419 Component
36790000 Manufacturing
$
9,585,040,000
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334413 Component
36740207 Manufacturing
$
77,000,000,000
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334418 Component
36720000 Manufacturing
$
27,266,438,000
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334413 Component
36740213 Manufacturing
$
10,044,736,000
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334413 Component
36740000 Manufacturing
$
682,953,980
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334413 Component
36740000 Manufacturing
$
2,191,395,000
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334413 Component
36740000 Manufacturing
$
5,438,399,900
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334413 Component
36740209 Manufacturing
$
21,000,000,000
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334413 Component
36740200 Manufacturing
$
2,712,660,900
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334419 Component
36790000 Manufacturing
$
701,207,700
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334413 Component
36740000 Manufacturing
$
16,675,000,000
Pensions and Funds
523991 67330000 $
8,612,000,000
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334413 Component
36740200 Manufacturing
$
5,255,000,000
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334413 Component
36740000 Manufacturing
$
3,239,141,100
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334413 Component
36740200 Manufacturing
$
1,878,588,900
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334413 Component
36740200 Manufacturing
$
2,638,155,000
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334413 Component
36740200 Manufacturing
$
1,238,716,200
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334413 Component
36740000 Manufacturing
$ 140,000,000,000
Holding Companies
551112 67199901 $
3,115,672,100
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334413 Component
36740000 Manufacturing
$
27,037,455,000
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334413 Component
36740200 Manufacturing
$
45,437,059,000
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334413 Component
36740000 Manufacturing
$
11,127,121,000
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334413 Component
36740207 Manufacturing
$
14,461,000,000
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334413 Component
36740000 Manufacturing
$
346,115,910
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334413 Component
36740200 Manufacturing
$
5,999,024,400
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334413 Component
36740200 Manufacturing
$
1,124,046,400
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334413 Component
36770000 Manufacturing
$
2,501,897,900
Semiconductor and other Electronic
334418 Component
36720000 Manufacturing
$
3,147,599,100

One Year Sales Growth
N/A
45.05%
24.62%
4.54%
-6.48%
5.51%
16.80%
5.71%
N/A
7.57%
-16.31%
N/A
-12.15%
-11.48%
N/A
0.03%
3.08%
6.70%
8.20%
7.85%
4.05%
N/A
-5.31%
3.11%
-8.42%
24.21%
99.36%
52.73%
-2.99%
-4.76%
23.96%
N/A
28.01%
N/A
2.78%
N/A
18.19%
25.16%
2.33%
0.54%
-5.37%
19.31%
17.13%
-6.24%
-0.48%

Market Value
N/A
$
93,763,172,000
$
6,421,352,500
$
42,430,715,000
$
58,776,258,000
$ 2,442,902,300,000
$
30,669,242,000
$ 192,071,690,000
N/A
$
4,514,744,100
$
11,078,266,000
N/A
$
5,416,554,200
$
8,818,566,400
N/A
$
54,299,180,000
$
7,146,709,500
$
50,653,086,000
$ 211,000,000,000
$
8,688,529,300
$
82,709,008,000
N/A
$
26,527,748,000
$
40,551,031,000
$
79,000,000,000
$
10,242,299,000
$
1,169,540,200
$ 444,205,220,000
$
55,105,246,000
$
16,132,366,000
$
20,642,791,000
N/A
$
8,248,570,300
N/A
$ 434,000,000,000
N/A
$
74,661,516,000
$ 531,535,380,000
$
15,704,185,000
$ 177,510,450,000
$
2,904,653,100
$
20,687,561,000
$
6,879,028,300
$
3,281,346,700
$
33,338,426,000

Semiconductor Company Information. Source: D&B Hoovers, 2021
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